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Abstract
We investigate the dynamics of borrower behavior in a microﬁnance
experiment in which subjects are jointly responsible for credit repayment.
Although cooperation levels are generally high, moral hazard problems
persist among borrowers. Moreover, the path dependency of decisions
mitigates the insurance eﬀect of joint liability.
We compare two conversion mechanisms from joint to individual liabil-
ity. First, an active choice of the joint liability contract does not systemati-
cally increase cooperation. Second, conversion based on repayment success
tends to have a detrimental impact on cooperation among the remaining
joint liability borrowers.
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Microﬁnance programs have been a very successful instrument for poverty alle-
viation since the 1970s. Nowadays they are widespread in developing countries
and have already been established in the western world. From the numerous
non-standard credit contracts implemented in practice, joint liability lending is
probably the most prevalent. Here, the responsibility for credit repayment is
borne by a group of several borrowers. If one person is not able to repay her
credit, other group members have to bail her out.
Joint liability contracts oﬀer a ‘social’ collateral for borrowers and at the
same time mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection problems between micro
banks and clients.1 Yet, this contract scheme also has potential shortcomings.
In this study, we focus on the moral hazard problems created among borrow-
ers.2 If borrowers can rely on the group, they have the incentive to free-ride
by shifting the repayment burden or investment risks to the group members.
Monitoring and social pressure can mitigate this problem; however, if social ties
between group members are loose or non-existent or if social sanctions are not
enforceable, joint liability schemes may not function properly as an insurance
against involuntary default.3
In practice, several microﬁnance banks have started to oﬀer individual li-
ability contracts to their clients. However, there is little empirical evidence
that helps to evaluate which contract scheme is preferable under what circum-
stances. In the description of a large-scale ﬁeld experiment, Gin´ e and Karlan
(2009) state that “the basic empirical question of the relative merits of group
versus individual liability has remained unanswered for many reasons of endo-
geneity. Merely comparing performance of one product versus another, within
or across lenders, fails to establish a causal relationship between the contract
terms and outcomes such as repayment, selection, or welfare, due to countless
unobserved characteristics that drive individual selection into one contract or
the other, as well as institutional choices on what to oﬀer, and how.”
1Stiglitz (1990), Banerjee et al. (1994) and Armend` ariz de Aghion (1999) show how moni-
toring and sanctioning among agents in a borrower group can mitigate moral hazard problems.
Furthermore, the selection of borrowers into credit groups helps to overcome adverse selection
problems (see Armend` ariz de Aghion and Gollier, 2000, Ghatak, 1999 and van Tassel, 1999).
Finally, peer pressure within borrower groups reduces strategic defaults (see Besley and Coate,
1995). For an overview of the theoretical literature see Morduch (1999).
2Other problematic factors of joint liability contracts are decreased attractiveness for good
risks and low ﬂexibility concerning heterogeneous credit demands, see Gin´ e and Karlan (2009)
for a discussion.
3Armend` ariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) mention kinship among villagers or anony-
mous credit programs in cities as examples for situations in which social interaction within
borrower groups might not be eﬀective.
2The goal of the present study is to complement existing empirical work by
investigating behavioral impacts of joint and individual liability in a controlled
laboratory environment. In particular, the focus is on behavioral dynamics,
as the interaction between borrowers might crucially inﬂuence the functioning
of group lending contracts. Moreover, the study compares the performance of
diﬀerent conversion mechanisms in mitigating moral hazard problems.
We let experimental subjects play a microﬁnance game up to 12 periods
under joint liability (Run 1) before some of them are converted into individual
liability (Run 2). Our decision variable is the level of eﬀort put into a risky
project. Under joint liability, borrowers face a social dilemma. While providing
the highest feasible eﬀort maximizes joint payoﬀs, the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium consists of choosing the lowest eﬀort level in each period. Moreover,
in line with common microﬁnance practice, we introduce dynamic incentives.
Credit provision is contingent on successful repayment in the previous period.4
We consider two conversion mechanisms from joint to individual liability.
In a ﬁrst treatment, subjects choose between an individual and a joint liability
contract after the ﬁrst run. In a second treatment, borrower groups with above-
average repayment performance are oﬀered individual contracts for Run 2 while
the other subjects continue under joint liability contracts. Behavior in both
treatments is compared to a reference setup in which subjects remain under
joint liability for the entire game.
We observe high average eﬀort levels in all experimental treatments. Never-
theless, within-group moral hazard can be observed, as subjects increase their
eﬀorts signiﬁcantly after being converted into individual liability. Moreover,
the path-dependency of behavior has a detrimental eﬀect for the functioning
of joint liability programs from a dynamic perspective. Eﬀort decisions are
positively related to partner eﬀort and negatively related to the frequency of
partner repayments. With respect to conversion mechanisms, we ﬁnd no sys-
tematic eﬀort increase in our treatment where subjects can select into credit
contract schemes. Here, contract choice is largely driven by individual experi-
ences with partners. By contrast, moral hazard problems among joint liability
borrowers tend to become stronger after performance based conversion.
In the following, we brieﬂy review the related empirical and experimental
literature on microﬁnance contracts (section 2). In the next step, we introduce
our experimental decision situation (section 3), describe the design details and
formulate hypotheses (section 4). We present aggregate and individual results
in section 5 and conclude in section 6.
4Armend` ariz de Aghion and Morduch (2000 and 2005) show that the threat of not receiving
follow-up loans may prevent strategic default of borrowers.
32 Related Literature
The experimental and empirical literature on the eﬀects of microﬁnance con-
tracts yields mixed results. There are several studies comparing repayment per-
formance of joint and individual liability contracts. Gomez and Santor (2003)
found superior repayment performance of group lending schemes due to both
selection eﬀects and decreasing within-group moral hazard problems in a Cana-
dian sample. In a laboratory experiment, Abbink et al. (2006) observed that,
although subjects had the option to default strategically, repayment perfor-
mance increased under joint liability relative to individual contracts. Cason
et al. (2009) conducted a microﬁnance experiment in which lending activities
and repayment rates were increased by group lending contracts in case of low
monitoring costs among borrowers.
However, other studies come to diﬀerent conclusions. In a controlled long-
term ﬁeld experiment by Gin´ e and Karlan (2009), a random sample of joint
liability borrowers from a Philippine microﬁnance institution was converted
into individual contracts while the remaining borrowers continued under group
liability. After three years, the samples did not diﬀer with respect to loan re-
payments.5 Moreover, in a comparison study of more than 300 microﬁnance
institutions, Cull et al. (2009) found no correlation between loan portfolio qual-
ity and the implemented lending method.
Regarding the behavioral implications of contract schemes there is some
evidence for incentives problems created by group liability contracts. Kono
(2006) carried out microﬁnance experiments in Vietnam showing that strategic
default increased if subjects were jointly responsible for repayment. A survey
study by Karlan (2007) highlighted the importance of peer monitoring and so-
cial sanctioning, as repayment performance of borrower groups increased with
stronger social ties between their members. Finally, Gin´ e et al. (forthcom-
ing) conducted experiments in urban Peru with a large sample of owners and
employees of micro-enterprizes and found a higher propensity to choose risky
investment projects under joint liability. This pattern was, however, mitigated
with the introduction of dynamic incentives.
As we model moral hazard among borrowers as a social dilemma, our ex-
perimental design is related to a standard public goods game. Results from
numerous replications of this experimental game show that positive cooperation
levels are established despite clear economic incentives to free-ride (see Ledyard,
1995, for an extensive survey of the literature). There are two kinds of design
5However, the study conﬁrmed some inherent problems of joint liability lending, as indi-
vidual liability programs were more likely to attract new customers.
4variations that are especially relevant in our context. First, selection processes
or orientation on out-of-equilibrium payoﬀs inﬂuence the degree of subjects’
cooperativeness (see Bohnet and K¨ ubler, 2005; Page et al., 2005; G¨ urerk et al.,
2006; Grimm and Mengel, 2009) and might therefore have an impact on the per-
formance of conversion mechanisms in our setting. Second, there is convincing
evidence that a substantial share of players condition their contributions on the
contributions of other players (see, for example, Fischbacher et al., 2001; Gun-
nthorsdottir et al., 2007; Ambrus and Pathak, 2009; Fischbacher and G¨ achter,
forthcoming). Conditional cooperation can be expected to aﬀect the degree
of eﬀort exertion within borrower groups and the functioning of group lending
from a dynamic perspective (we will come back to this point in section 4).
3 Decision Situation and Experimental Parameters
In our experimental setting we model the eﬀort decisions of borrowers after
being granted a credit amount of I by a micro bank. The credit is used for
a risky investment project that pays revenue R > 0 in case of success and 0
in case of failure. Every borrower chooses her eﬀort level e from the interval
[e0;emax] that inﬂuences project success according to the probability function
p(e) with p′(e) > 0 and p′′(e) = 0. Associated eﬀort costs are captured by
the cost function c(e) with c′(e) > 0 and c′′(e) = 0 and have to be incurred
irrespective of the project outcome.
Project payoﬀs are randomly determined after eﬀort levels have been chosen.
Under joint liability, players are informed about payoﬀs and eﬀort levels of
their partners. In case of suﬃcient funds, loan repayments L for each credit
are automatically deducted from borrowers’ payoﬀs. If the credit sum is fully
repaid, new credits are provided in the next period and borrowers decide again
about their eﬀorts. In case of default, borrowers receive no further credit in the
subsequent periods of the experimental run.
We set a number of additional restrictions on the experimental variables:
ﬁrst, as we assume that R  2L, a borrower is able to repay two loans in case
of success under joint liability.6 Next, there is an exogenous success probabil-
ity p0 > 0 regardless of eﬀort provision so that total success probability p is
determined by p = p0 + p(e). Finally, we assume that providing the maximum
feasible eﬀort still bears a risk of project failure, as p(e0) + p(emax) < 1, in
order to capture the insurance eﬀect of joint liability contracts compared to
individual loans.
6By this assumption we avoid non-linearities of proﬁt functions under joint liability con-
tracts.
5Under individual liability a borrower’s expected payoﬀ in the one-shot game
is
E[i(ei)] = [p0 + pi(ei)]  (R   L)   c(ei) (1)
The ﬁrst-order-condition for optimal eﬀort yields p′(e)(R L) = c′(e). As
marginal gains and costs of eﬀort are constant per assumption, the optimum
in the one-shot game is a corner solution: it is either optimal to choose the
maximum eﬀort level emax or the minimum e0.
For joint liability contracts we consider the case that two persons form
a borrower pair. Assuming that project payoﬀs are independent, the payoﬀ
function of borrower i is:
E[i(ei;ej)] = [p0 + pi(ei)]  [p0 + pj(ej)]  (R   L)+
[p0 + pi(ei)]  [1   p0   pj(ej)]  (R   2L)   c(ei) (2)
With probability [p0 + pi(e)]  [p0 + pj(e)] both partners succeed and repay
their own loans. However, with probability [p0+pi(e)][1 p0 pj(ej)] borrower
i’s project succeeds while partner j’s project fails. Then borrower i’s payoﬀ is
reduced also by j’s obligation. The optimal eﬀort choice by borrower i in the
one-shot game is determined by p′(e)  [p0 + pj(ej)]  (R   L) + p′(e)  [1   p0  
pj(ej)]  (R   2L) = c′(e). Replacing p′(e) = ¯ p and c′(e) = ¯ c and assuming that
borrower j also chooses the proﬁt-maximizing eﬀort level yields ¯ p[R L (1 
p0   pj(e∗
j))  L] ≷ ¯ c.
The moral hazard problem among borrowers becomes clear if we compare
ﬁrst-order conditions under both contracts. As the term 1 p0 pj(e∗
j) is greater
than zero per assumption, a provision of emax becomes less likely under group
lending. The risk that the partner’s loan has to be repaid lowers marginal gains
from eﬀort exertion.
Abstracting from discounting, the payoﬀ function for individual borrowers
in period t of the repeated setting is








i;k)] displays expected payoﬀs from optimal eﬀort
decisions in latter periods of the game. Equation (3) shows that dynamic incen-
tives increase the attractiveness of eﬀort exertion in period t, because payoﬀs
6from credits in latter rounds are lost after a default. Under a joint liability
contract, player i’s payoﬀ function in t is
E[i(ei;t;ej;t)] =

















j;k)])   c(ei) (4)
Compared to the one-shot joint liability game, the payoﬀ function is ex-
tended by a third revenue term indicating the insurance eﬀect of group lending
from borrower i’s perspective. Even if she fails to repay her credit in period t,
there is a positive probability that the partner bails her out and she receives
payoﬀs from further credits.
The path of optimal eﬀort decisions in this game can be determined by
backwards induction and depends on the precise set of parameters. In the










p(e) 0:05  e
c(e) 6  e
T 12
To model the decision situation in the desired way, parameters have to meet
several requirements. The ﬁrst requirement is related to individual liability
contracts and the functioning of dynamic incentives: the threat of not receiv-
ing follow-up loans must provide a disciplining eﬀect on agents’ eﬀort choices.
Therefore, full eﬀort exertion should be optimal for the individual borrower i
in the repeated setting. With our parameters, equilibrium eﬀort for a single
7borrower is e∗
i;t = 8 in t = 1;:::;11 and e∗
i;t = 0 in t = 12. The expected payoﬀ
for the 12-period game is E[i(e∗
i)] = 301:38.
Furthermore, we want to create a social dilemma among borrowers un-
der joint liability. It can be easily shown that with the present parameters,
the symmetric equilibrium eﬀort under group lending for borrowers i and j
is e∗
i;t = e∗





i)] = 96:84. The maximum sum of payoﬀs is reached, however, if both
borrowers choose the maximum feasible level ei;t = ej;t = 8 for t = 1;:::;12. In
this case, expected payoﬀs are E[i] = E[j] = 374:88.7
Finally, please note that the parameters display the insurance eﬀect of joint
liability lending. First, expected payoﬀs from the full eﬀort strategy under
group lending exceed equilibrium payoﬀs under individual contracts. Second,
individual contracts yield higher payoﬀs in equilibrium than group contracts,
as borrowers should be worse oﬀ under joint responsibility if low cooperation is
established.
4 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
We conducted 8 experimental sessions in which altogether 256 subjects took
part (32 subjects per session), most of them with a major in Economics, Busi-
ness Administration or related ﬁelds. In each session participants were divided
into matching groups of 8 persons (subjects were not aware of this procedure).
The experiment consisted of two runs of up to 12 rounds of the described deci-
sion situation.
All subjects played Run 1 under joint liability. Before the experiment began,
two anonymous partners were matched to form a borrower pair for the entire
ﬁrst run. As long as the sum of loan repayments was covered in a given period,
the borrower pair received two new loans and decided simultaneously about
eﬀort levels in the next period. After each decision, subjects were informed
about eﬀort levels and project revenues of both group members.
The treatment variation consisted of diﬀerent conversion mechanisms from
joint to individual liability after Run 1 was completed. These treatments –
denoted with SELECT and PERFORM in the remainder of the paper – display
two possible options of micro banks with respect to contract oﬀers.
First, treatment SELECT refers to the option of oﬀering potential borrowers
unrestricted access to contract schemes. Here, subjects could opt either for an
7With the present parametrization, the threat of denied credit in subsequent periods is not
severe enough to make full eﬀort exertion the optimal choice. This is due to the relatively
high exogenous success probability – even if both borrowers choose e = e0 = 0, the probability
of receiving a follow-up loan is still 75% – and the small number of repetitions.
8individual or a joint liability contract to be applied for the next 12 periods.
Subjects who had chosen joint liability contracts were then paired with a new
anonymous partner from their experimental matching group.8
Second, treatment PERFORM depicts the common practice of oﬀering in-
dividual contracts to clients with good credit histories. Borrower pairs were
converted to individual liability on the basis of their repayment performance
in Run 1. In our experiment, the two pairs per matching group with the high-
est number of successfully repaid loans were subsequently oﬀered individual
contracts, while the other two pairs remained under joint liability and were
rematched with a new partner.9 In the base speciﬁcation of this treatment
(referred to as NOINFO), information about the conversion was provided at
the same time as in the other treatments, namely after Run 1 was completed.
In addition, to control for a possible eﬀect of ex-ante information about the
possibility of conversion, we conducted speciﬁcation INFO that was identical to
NOINFO except that subjects were informed about the conversion mechanism
already before the experiment started.
Finally, we implemented a benchmark treatment (BASE) to distinguish be-
tween the eﬀects of the conversion mechanisms on eﬀort exertion and the eﬀects
of repeated interaction in borrower groups. Here, subjects played the game un-
der joint liability in both runs. Similar to the other treatments, partners were
rematched after the ﬁrst run.
Over the periods in which they received loans, subjects accumulated expe-
rimental payoﬀs. If period losses occurred, for example if a project failed and
the subject had exerted positive eﬀort levels, the losses were subtracted from
accumulated payoﬀs. After the experiment, one run was randomly determined
by the role of a die. Accumulated payoﬀs of this run were subsequently con-
verted with an exchange rate of 30 experimental currency units per Euro and
paid out to the participants.
The focus of our study is on the dynamics of moral hazard among borrowers.
Orientation on strict payoﬀ maximization implies the choice of minimum eﬀort
in each period. However, given the evidence from public goods games, we expect
generally positive average eﬀort levels. Yet, due to the incentives to free-ride, we
expect that subjects exert less eﬀort under joint liability than under individual
contracts (Hypothesis 1).
8In case an uneven number of subjects per matching group had opted for joint liability,
one person was randomly chosen and converted into individual liability.
9If two or more pairs had the same repayment performance and this was relevant for
the assignment to contract schemes in the second run, one pair was randomly chosen for
conversion.
9With respect to conversion mechanisms, we hypothesize that both selec-
tion based and performance based conversion have behavioral implications on
subjects’ general cooperativeness under group lending. First, in line with the
evidence from studies about selection in dilemma games, we hypothesize that
the choice of joint liability contracts induces higher eﬀort levels in Run 2 rela-
tive to the baseline treatment (Hypothesis 2). Second, for a similar reason, we
expect lower relative eﬀort levels under joint liability after performance based
conversion in Run 2. Provided that there is a suﬃciently strong correlation be-
tween eﬀort and repayment success, remaining under group lending is a signal
for low cooperativeness in the ﬁrst run. In this case, we expect subjects’ will-
ingness to exert eﬀort to be lower than in the reference treatment (Hypothesis
3).10
With respect to individual behavior, we hypothesize that eﬀorts in both
runs are path-dependent. Similar to conditional cooperation in public goods
games, we expect decisions to be positively correlated with partner decisions
(Hypothesis 4). This would imply that group lending contracts become in-
creasingly vulnerable against default over time if at least one partner chooses
lower-than-maximum eﬀort levels.
The experimental sessions took place in the period from April 2008 to Febru-
ary 2009 in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research. Subjects were
recruited using Greiner’s Online Recruitment System ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
The experiment was computerized using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
After subjects arrived and were randomly assigned to a cubicle, instructions
were distributed.11 After the experiment, subjects answered survey questions
about demographical data and the underlying motivations for their decisions.
Earnings for the selected run were privately paid out. The average payoﬀ was
14.79 Euros (including an increased show-up fee of 5.00 Euros to cover potential
losses in the course of the game). Each session lasted approximately one and a
half hours.
10Please note that ex-ante information about performance related conversion might inﬂuence
behavior already in the ﬁrst run of the experiment (speciﬁcation INFO in the PERFORM
treatment). This speciﬁcation gives rise to a large number of equilibria in which positive eﬀort
levels are provided by at least some of the joint liability pairs. Hence, ex-ante information could
play a disciplining role for eﬀort exertion in Run 1. On a behavioral level, however, presenting
both individual and group liability schemes may lead to a higher saliency of incentive problems
among borrowers and subsequently to lower eﬀorts so that the net eﬀect is unclear.
11Instructions translated from German can be found in the Appendix.
105 Experimental Results
In the following, we will present results on the aggregate level and compare our
experimental treatments with respect to eﬀort exertion and repayment perfor-
mance. Next, we will analyze inﬂuence factors on individual eﬀort decisions and
ﬁnally investigate motivations for contract choices in the SELECT treatment.
5.1 Aggregate Results
Figure 1 displays average eﬀort levels calculated over all active borrowers in
both runs for each experimental treatment. The abbreviations JL and IL refer
to subjects under joint liability and individual liability, respectively.
FIGURE 1











Run 1 JL Run 2 JL Run 2 IL
High eﬀort levels are achieved in both runs, with averages reaching some
70% to 90% of the maximum feasible eﬀort. In the ﬁrst run, average eﬀort
levels account for 5.89 in treatment SELECT, 5.62 in treatment PERFORM
and 6.04 in treatment BASE. Comparing the treatments with two-sided Mann-
Whitney-U (MWU) tests reveals no signiﬁcant diﬀerences on conventional levels
(p > :1).12
12For our analysis, we pool the data of the NOINFO and INFO speciﬁcations in treatment
PERFORM, because they do not diﬀer with respect to eﬀort levels. Average eﬀorts for spec-
iﬁcations NOINFO (INFO) are 5.70 (5.53) under joint liability in Run 1, 6.00 (5.30) under
joint liability in Run 2 and 7.09 (6.82) under individual liability in Run 2. The correspond-
ing p-values of two-sided Mann-Whitney-U (MWU) tests for eﬀort comparisons between the
speciﬁcations yield p = :721, p = :368 and p = :458, respectively.
11In line with incentives, subjects converted to individual liability converge to
full eﬀort exertion in Run 2. Here, average eﬀort levels for the second run in-
crease to 6.96 (PERFORM) and 7.27 (SELECT). Two-sided Wilcoxon Matched
Pairs Signed Rank (WMPSR) tests conﬁrm that this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant
(p = :016 for SELECT and p < :001 for PERFORM). This supports our Hy-
pothesis 1 that moral hazard among borrowers exists under group lending.
Among the remaining borrower pairs in Run 2, we observe a small increase of
average eﬀort irrespective of the treatment: the corresponding values are 6.28
in treatment SELECT, 5.68 in treatment PERFORM and 6.37 in treatment
BASE. However, this diﬀerence is weakly signiﬁcant only in BASE (p = :078
for BASE, p = :844 for SELECT and p = :706 for PERFORM, respectively,
two-sided WMPSR tests).
With respect to the impact of conversion mechanisms, we ﬁnd no evidence
in line with Hypothesis 2 that selection into group contracts systematically
increases cooperation among borrower pairs. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the eﬀort levels in BASE and SELECT (p = :574, two-sided MWU
test). A reason for this result could lie in the motivations behind subjects’
contract choices (we will discuss this issue in subsection 5.3).
In Run 2, subjects in treatment PERFORM put (weakly) signiﬁcantly
lower eﬀorts into their projects than their counterparts in the BASE treatment
(p = :068, two-sided MWU test). This observation provides some evidence for
Hypothesis 3 about the dampening eﬀect of performance based conversion on
cooperation of the remaining borrower pairs. The prospect of being matched
with a borrower having a weak repayment performance decreases subjects’ will-
ingness to exert high eﬀort levels.13
Finally, we compare the repayment performance of the treatments using
relative repayment rates which we deﬁne as the percentage share of loans repaid
at total feasible loans in all 12 periods per run. Table 2 lists the averages of all
treatments for both runs.
There are no signiﬁcant treatment diﬀerences concerning credit repayments
per contract (pairwise MWU tests yield p > :1 in all cases). Relative repayment
rates decrease on average in Run 2, but only signiﬁcantly so among subjects
under individual liability (p = :008 for SELECT and p < :001 for PERFORM,
two-sided WMPSR tests). Here, the relative eﬀort increase of the subjects
cannot oﬀset their higher vulnerability against unintentional defaults. Due to
13Our experimental data conﬁrms that in the PERFORM treatment, repayment success
is a valid signal for exerted eﬀort on average. Calculated over Run 1, the correlation be-
tween the number of successful repayments and average eﬀort levels is positive and signiﬁcant
(Spearman’s  = :253, p = :001).
12TABLE 2
Average Relative Repayment Rates per Treatment in %
Treatment Run 1 Run 2
Joint Liability Individual Liability Joint Liability
SELECT 83.3 47.8 77.9
PERFORM 81.3 45.1 71.6
BASE 78.1 – 71.4
generally high eﬀort levels under group lending, the insurance eﬀect of joint
liability contracts dominates the moral hazard eﬀect in our setting.
5.2 Individual Decisions
To identify the drivers of individual behavior under joint liability, we calculate
regression models with random eﬀects on the level of experimental subjects.14
Our dependent variable is the individual eﬀort choice in a given period. Table 3
displays the regression results.
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (Model 1) for Run 1, we include the variables Period
(number of period) and ej;t−1 (partner’s eﬀort level in the last period). The
coeﬃcient for Period is negative and signiﬁcant indicating a downward trend of
eﬀort over time. More importantly, we ﬁnd evidence for the responsiveness of
subjects concerning partner eﬀort, as the sign of ej;t−1 is positive and highly sig-
niﬁcant. This is in line with Hypothesis 4 and emphasizes the path-dependency
of cooperation in the group lending scheme: The lower the partner’s eﬀort has
been in the previous period, the lower the subsequent eﬀort choice of a subject
is.
In addition, we include the variable TimesPaidt−1 in Model 2 indicating the
accumulated number of periods in which a subject had to repay the loan of her
partner in the period before the eﬀort choice. Due to its correlation with eﬀort
ej;t−1, we also include the interaction term ej;t−1 X TimesPaidt−1.15 Model 2
shows that – controlling for the partner’s eﬀort level – a subject’s willingness to
exert eﬀort declines signiﬁcantly with the number of partner repayments. As the
interaction term is positive and signiﬁcant, the negative eﬀect of TimesPaidt−1
becomes smaller with higher levels of partner eﬀort. Yet, its estimated net eﬀect
remains negative if calculated at the mean value of ej;t−1  5:35 in Run 1. All in
all, these results suggest that the insurance eﬀect of group lending is dampened
14Please note that our results remain similar if we use linear models with ﬁxed eﬀects or
simple OLS models with clustered standard errors.
15Spearman -values for the correlation between TimesPaidt 1 and ej;t 1 calculated over
all treatments are  =  :188 in Run 1 (p < :001) and  =  :186 in Run 2 (p < :001).
13TABLE 3
Individual Effort Decisions under Joint Liability
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Dependent Variable ei;t ei;t ei;t ei;t ei;t
Run 1 1 2 1 2
Period -0.152*** -0.046*** -0.080*** -0.038** -0.096***
[0.010] [0.014] [0.019] [0.016] [0.021]
ej;t 1 0.209*** 0.336*** 0.138*** 0.373*** 0.156***
[0.014] [0.028] [0.040] [0.036] [0.050]
TimesPaidt 1 -0.577*** -0.742*** -0.582*** -0.865***
[0.099] [0.138] [0.141] [0.201]
ej;t 1 X TimesPaidt 1 0.055*** 0.083*** 0.057*** 0.114***





Risk Preference -0.095** -0.145**
[0.037] [0.069]
Constant 5.483*** 4.231*** 6.878*** 4.635*** 7.735***
[0.110] [0.197] [0.464] [0.318] [0.629]
Observations 2594 2338 1336 1440 968
Subjects 256 252 160 156 112
Wald-2 347.6 581.1 171.5 385 148.1
Random eﬀects are calculated on the level of experimental subjects. Standard errors are
given in brackets. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance levels of p < 0:01, p < 0:05 and p < 0:1,
respectively.
over time, as the willingness to exert eﬀort declines after agents had to stand
in for each other.16
Our conclusions remain robust for joint liability borrowers in Run 2 (Model
3). Here, we include also the dummy variables SELECT and PERFORM for
the respective treatments. In line with results from non-parametric tests, the
treatment dummy for PERFORM has a negative sign and is (weakly) signiﬁcant
while the dummy for the SELECT treatment is not signiﬁcant. Moreover, the
signs and signiﬁcance levels of the variables capturing the interaction within
borrower pairs are comparable to Run 1.
Please note that an important inﬂuence factor in our setting might be risk
aversion. The threat of receiving no further credit after a default might induce
higher eﬀort exertion regardless of partner choices. Therefore, as a robustness
check, we collected a survey measure for risk aversion in 5 of 8 experimental
sessions, namely the answer to the question “Are you generally willing to take
16Conclusions are the same if we include a dummy for the repayment of the partner’s loan
in the preceding period instead of accumulated repayments.
14risks, or do you try to avoid risks?” taken from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP).17 People could answer on a scale from 0 (risk averse) to 10
(fully prepared to take risks). We rerun regression Models 2 and 3 including
the variable for risk preferences (see Models 4 and 5). In both speciﬁcations the
coeﬃcient has the expected negative sign and is signiﬁcant. The more risk averse
a person is – indicated by lower values for the risk preference variable –, the
higher her estimated eﬀort is. Hence, the possibility of exclusion from further
credits has a disciplinary eﬀect among borrower pairs. However, the impact of
the variables concerning partner interaction (ej;t−1 and TimesPaidt−1) remains
equally robust if we control for risk aversion.18
5.3 Selection into Contracts
In the SELECTION treatment, 25 out of 64 subjects (39.1%) opted for the in-
dividual contract. To investigate possible motivations behind contract choices
and to explain why self-selection does not systematically increase eﬀort levels,
we calculate several measures for Run 1 separately for subjects choosing indi-
vidual and joint liability (see Table 4). Averages are compared on the level of
experimental matching groups using two-sided WMPSR tests.
TABLE 4
Influence Factors for Contract Choices
Contract Choice Individual Joint p-value
Liability Liability
Own Eﬀort 5.54 6.10 .383
Partner Eﬀort 5.28 6.25 .039
Paid for Partner (Share of Periods) 0.21 0.12 .016
Partner paid (Share of Periods) 0.14 0.17 .375
Risk Preference* 4.00 4.53 .375
Mean values are compared using two-sided WPMSR tests.
*Measure was collected for 32 out of 64 subjects in the SELECT treatment.
The ﬁrst variable of interest is own average eﬀort. Following Hypothesis 2,
one could expect that the more cooperative subjects select into the joint liability
contract. However, although average eﬀorts among joint liability subjects are
somewhat higher (6.10 compared to 5.54 of subjects choosing individual liabil-
ity), the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant. In contrast, partner behavior seems to be
more important for the contract choice, as the average eﬀort exerted by part-
ners of subjects opting for individual contracts is signiﬁcantly lower (5.28 versus
17For a description of the SOEP see Wagner et al. (2007).
18Due to the lower number of observations, the dummy variable for the PERFORM treat-
ment is not signiﬁcant in Model 5.
156.25, p = :034, WMPSR). Moreover, similar to individual eﬀort decisions, the
frequency of partner repayments inﬂuences contract selection. Individual liabil-
ity subjects had to repay their partners’ loans signiﬁcantly more often in Run
1 than subjects choosing joint liability (in 21% of all active periods compared
to 12%, p = :016, WMPSR). In contrast, the share of periods in which subjects
relied on their partners are roughly the same (14% for individual contracts and
17% for joint liability contracts). Finally, subjects do not diﬀer with respect to
risk preferences (p = :375, two-sided WMPSR test).
To sum up, our results suggest that contract choices are predominantly
directed by experiences with the partner: The lower a partner’s average eﬀort
and the higher the frequency of partner repayments in Run 1 are, the more
likely a person is to prefer the individual credit contract for Run 2.
6 Conclusions
We have conducted a microﬁnance experiment in which subjects decided about
the eﬀort put into risky investment projects under joint and individual credit
contracts. Under the joint liability contract, borrowers face a social dilemma.
While it would be collectively optimal to exert the highest possible eﬀort, it is
individually rational to choose the minimum eﬀort level.
In the ﬁrst run of the experiment, all participants receive group lending con-
tracts. In the second run, participants are converted to individual contracts on
the basis of self-selection or repayment success. Both treatments are compared
to a reference setting in which subjects interact under joint liability for both
runs.
Subjects exert high average eﬀort levels under group lending in all treat-
ments and both runs. It follows that in our setting, joint liability contracts
are superior to individual contracts in terms of repayment performance. Yet,
within-group moral hazard still persists for two reasons. First, subjects choose
signiﬁcantly higher eﬀorts under individual contracts than under joint liabil-
ity contracts. Second, eﬀort decisions are highly path-dependent, as borrowers
condition their eﬀorts on partner behavior. In addition, realized outcomes of
investment projects also have an impact on eﬀort choices. The more often a
subject had to repay the partner’s loan, the lower her estimated eﬀort is in
subsequent periods.
A comparison of conversion mechanisms shows that removing the groups
with a high repayment performance may have a negative impact on the re-
maining borrowers. The latter subjects tend to exert lower eﬀorts than their
counterparts in the reference treatment. In contrast, self-selection into con-
16tracts does not systematically change average eﬀorts in Run 2. There is also
no sign for a systematic selection of cooperative players into the joint liability
scheme. Instead, partner eﬀorts and the frequency of double repayments are
more important drivers for the contract choice.
To sum up, while our controlled laboratory experiment captures only few
of the aspects that determine the success of microﬁnance programs in the ﬁeld,
it points out the necessity to monitor within-group dynamics. Because micro
banks in practice often establish lasting relationships with their customers,
the dynamic interaction within borrower groups might crucially inﬂuence the
functioning of joint liability.
Finally, our study provides a ﬁrst test of the eﬀects of alternative conver-
sion mechanisms on cooperation avoiding sample-selection problems that may
emerge with ﬁeld data. To connect ﬁeld studies and laboratory experiments
might be a promising approach for further research in the microﬁnance con-
text.
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20Appendix
A Instructions
Below we show the instructions for the ﬁrst and second run in treatment SE-
LECT. Instructions for the other groups and treatments were formulated in a
similar way.
Instructions: General Information
Welcome to the experiment! In this experiment you can earn money. How
much depends on your decisions and the decisions of other participants.
From now on, please do not communicate with other participants. If you have
a question concerning the experiment, please raise your hand! We will come to
you and answer your question. If you violate these rules, we have to exclude
you from the experiment and all payoﬀs.
In the experiment, ECU is used as the currency. At the end of the experiment,
your payoﬀ in ECU is converted into Euro and paid out in cash. The exchange
rate is 30 ECU = 1 Euro. In the experiment, all ECU amounts are rounded to
whole numbers.
The experiment consists of two runs. After the experiment, one of the two runs
is randomly selected. The sum of period payoﬀs of this run is paid out. In
addition, you receive an amount of 5.00 Euros for your participation in the ex-
periment, which is paid out at the end regardless of the decisions. If you make
a loss in the course of the experiment, it will be set oﬀ against the amount of
5.00 Euros.
Instructions: First Run
The following instructions refer to the ﬁrst run. After the ﬁrst run you will
receive new instructions.
The ﬁrst run consists of 12 periods. Previous to the ﬁrst run, pairs of two
participants are formed randomly. These pairs interact with each other during
the whole ﬁrst run. The identity of the other participant is secret, and no
other participant will be informed about your identity. Thus, your decisions
are anonymous.
The following explanations apply to you and to the other participant. The
other participant faces exactly the same decision situation as you.
21In the ﬁrst period of the experiment, you and the other participant receive a
credit of 50 ECU each. The credit amounts automatically fund a risky invest-
ment project. Each participant has a personal investment project into which
her credit is invested.
Possible payoﬀs of the investment project are as follows:
 In case of success, each investment project achieves a payoﬀ of 200 ECU.
 In case of failure, each investment project achieves a payoﬀ of 0 ECU.
The payoﬀ of your investment project and the payoﬀ of the other participant’s
investment project are independent of each other.
The success probability of your project is inﬂuenced by your level of eﬀort. You
can choose every integer between A = 0 (lowest eﬀort) and A = 8 (highest
eﬀort) as eﬀort level (abbreviated with A in the following).
 If you choose A = 0, the success probability of your project is 50%.
 For every unit of eﬀort, the success probability of your project increases
by 5%.
 Examples:
{ If you choose A = 1, the success probability of your project is 55%.
{ In case of A = 2, the success probability of your project is 60%.
{ ...
{ In case of the highest eﬀort level A = 8, the success probability of
your project is 90%.
For every unit of eﬀort that you choose, you have costs of 6 ECU. (Example:
If you choose A = 4, the costs of eﬀort are 46 ECU = 24 ECU.) The costs for
your chosen eﬀort level incur regardless of the project success.
You ﬁnd an overview of possible eﬀort levels and the associated costs in the
following table.
22Eﬀort level chosen 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Success probability
of the project in % 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
Eﬀort costs 0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48
After you and the other participant have chosen eﬀort levels, payoﬀs of both
investment projects are randomly determined. You are informed about:
 the payoﬀ of your project (either 200 ECU or 0 ECU).
 the payoﬀ of the other participant’s project (either 200 ECU or 0 ECU).
 your chosen eﬀort level and eﬀort costs.
 the other participant’s eﬀort level and her eﬀort costs.
 your period payoﬀ and the sum of period payoﬀs in this run.
 the other participant’s period payoﬀ and the sum of her period payoﬀs in
this run.
The repayment amount for your credit is 100 ECU, the repayment amount for
the other participant’s credit is also 100 ECU. After payoﬀs of the investment
projects are determined, credits have to be repaid. You and the other partici-
pant are jointly responsible for the sum of both repayment amounts (100 ECU
+ 100 ECU = 200 ECU).
If your project was successful (your payoﬀ = 200 ECU), the repayment for your
credit (= 100 ECU) is deducted automatically from your payoﬀ. If at the same
time the other participant’s project was not successful (payoﬀ = 0 ECU), she
is not able to repay her credit. In that case the other participant’s repayment
is also deducted automatically from your payoﬀ.
If your project was not successful (your payoﬀ = 0 ECU), you are not able to
repay your credit. If at the same time the project of the other participant was
successful (payoﬀ = 200 ECU), your repayment is deducted automatically from
the payoﬀ of the other participant.
It is not possible to use payoﬀs from previous periods for credit repayments.
23Your payoﬀ in a period in which you have received a credit is determined as
follows:




If the sum of both repayment amounts (= 200 ECU) is repaid, you and the
other participant receive a new credit of 50 ECU in the next period and the
decision situation proceeds again as described.
If less than the sum of both repayments (= 200 ECU) is repaid in one period,
the ﬁrst run is over for you and the other participant. You and the other par-
ticipant will not receive a new credit for the rest of this run and will not make
any decisions.
Instructions: Second Run
Welcome to the second run of the experiment! The second run of the experiment
consists of 12 periods. For this run, all participants are divided into two groups,
group 1 and group 2. Before the experiment starts, you can choose the group
you want to belong to. If you have chosen one group, your choice is valid for
the entire second run.
Participants choosing group 1 are responsible only for the repayment of their
own credit during the entire second run. Otherwise the decision situation is
identical to the decision situation in the ﬁrst run. If a participant of group 1 is
not able to repay her credit (= 100 ECU) in one period, the second run is over
for her. In that case, the participant will not receive a new credit for the rest
of the run and will not make any decisions.
Participants choosing group 2 are again – together with another participant –
responsible for the sum of repayments of both credits in the second run. Analo-
gous to the ﬁrst run, pairs of two participants are formed randomly previous to
run 2. These pairs will interact with each other during the whole second run.
The decision situation is identical to the decision situation in the ﬁrst run of
the experiment. If a pair of participants repays less than the sum of both
repayment amounts (= 200 ECU) in one period, the second run is over for both
participants. In that case, both participants will not receive a new credit for
the rest of this run and will not make any decisions.
24With respect to the assignment of participants to group 2, it is guaranteed that
no participants interact with each other that were matched in the ﬁrst run of the
experiment. The exception is that two participants that were matched in the
ﬁrst run are the only participants in group 2. If an odd number of participants
chooses group 2, one participant is randomly selected and assigned to group 1.
25